JBLM Growth Implementation II
Project Background
JBLM is a Power Projection Platform, or forward operating deployment base, supporting national defense efforts in the South Sound Region. This requires the ability to quickly deploy resources for defense
operations. Eleven of the top 22 highest risk critical assets identified during the MIRR planning process were transportation assets at risk for considerable damage due to disaster events, most significantly a large earthquake.
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Transportation Corridor Readiness Study
Background
This damage can significantly hinder JBLM’s ability to deploy and respond during and after disaster events, particularly a large earthquake. In addition, several broader transportation issues associated with
ensuring effective movement of service members and resources along key corridors were identified including the need for the installation to deploy people and equipment, installation access, congestion management, and emergency evacuation. The need for a resilient transportation system that supports these critical functions is key to the success of the installation’s mission and a requirement of the Master Installation Plan.
Emergency transportation planning and system resilience is a focus of WSDOT and regional Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) that was highlighted by both the 2001 Nisqually earthquake and the 2016 Cascadia Rising exercise. The intent of this project is to build upon that work through a lens that focuses on transportation support to the installation.
Building on the 2024 MIRR and other regional transportation planning exercises, SSMCP will conduct a regional defense-focused JBLM area Transportation Corridor Readiness Study to identify, evaluate, and address gaps. 11 of the top 22 highest risk critical assets identified during the 2024 MIRR planning process were transportation assets at risk for considerable damage due to disaster events, most significantly a large earthquake. Such damage would significantly hinder JBLM’s ability to deploy and respond during and after disaster events.
In addition, several broader transportation issues associated with ensuring effective movement of service members and resources along key corridors were identified, including the need for the installation to deploy people and equipment, installation access, congestion management, and emergency evacuation. The need for a resilient transportation system that supports these critical functions is key to the success of the installation’s mission and a requirement of the JBLM Master Installation Plan.
Approach
Recognizing that transportation system improvements sufficient to achieve this goal are not achievable soon but would more likely occur 10-20 years out, the assessment process will develop recommendations for operational measures to respond to a disaster event during the interim, in addition to the recommendations for capital improvement planning.
The assessment consists of the steps outlined below:
1. Confirm Priority Transportation Corridors
2. Develop Project Stakeholders and Responsibilities for each Corridor
3. Establish Key Planning Scenarios
4. Conduct Enhanced Risk and Resilience Assessment
5. Develop Adaptation Recommendations
6. Identify Funding Strategies and Implementation Plan
Communications Interoperability Plan
Background
The Communications Lifeline in the JBLM Defense Community can be best characterized as a “system of systems” connecting a network of partners and technologies. This includes partners with jurisdictional responsibility (e.g., service areas for law enforcement and fire service agencies) and partners with responsibility for specific assets (e.g., Washington State Patrol and Interstate 5). Recognizing this interconnectivity, partners in the region have made significant advances in enhancing communications interoperability in the region in recent years.
In many areas these systems are interoperable and communication flows seamlessly between partners, but there remain gaps, including areas around JBLM, that can create challenges when circumstances require quick and effective communication between partners using systems that lack interoperability. For example, in some cases the radio systems and frequencies/Talk Groups used in emergency response differ between JBLM and its surrounding defense community partners.
This lack of interoperability hinders effective coordination (e.g., issues of permission and authority) and communication (e.g., shared frequencies) during emergencies as well as creates barriers for interagency training.
Approach
Approach
Building on regional agency communication plans, the project team will develop a Defense Community Communication Interoperability Plan that better integrates regional emergency communications in the event of a disaster. The planning process will consist of the steps outlined below.
- Assess Local Defense Community Communications Capability
- Develop Defense Community Communication Interoperability Plan
- Training and Exercise Strategy
Energy Grid Readiness Plan
Background
The JBLM Defense Community and JBLM are reliant on power to perform many mission critical activities; hazard events can result in infrastructure damage and supply chain disruptions that impact the reliability of the grid. A key aspect of energy resilience is ensuring that the power generation, transmission, and distributions systems are supported by redundancy and that technologies employed are augmented by effective management and coordination strategies between partners. Tacoma Public Utilities provides electric power for JBLM through six primary substations. Currently, no built-in energy storage capacity exists at these substations, which means the installation and community may compete for the same energy resources during an emergency or disaster that disrupts the energy grid. Additionally, JBLM is actively engaged in planning for energy resilience through exploration of strategies to allow the installation to function as an ‘island’ when the energy grid is disrupted outside the fence line. While on-base solutions are a key part of any solution, particularly with the availability of protected land, there is strong opportunity to collaborate on a strategy that is also beneficial to the JBLM Defense Community.
Associated Hazards
Multiple hazards can impact the resilience of the Energy Lifeline and will require implementation of strategies to manage use, prioritize scarce resources, and meet the needs of the local defense community. Power disruption is considered a cascading hazard and can result from hazards with acute impacts (e.g., a severe storm damaging power transmission and distribution assets) or hazards with more slow moving impacts (e.g., more frequent extreme heat events straining the system due to increased demand for power for cooling).
Approach
The Energy Grid Resilience Study is designed to understand what combinations of power generation in the community and on the installation makes the most sense through the lens of energy resilience. It will result in an identification and prioritization of technologies that are of shared benefit to the community and JBLM.
1. Establish the Project Team
2. Determine Energy Resilience Courses of Action
3. Establish Methodology and Conduct Analysis
4. Identify Alternatives
5. Select Alternative and Plan for Implementation